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01 / Project update

Right Track.Refreshing RRM, together.

Building on more than 20 years of Rail Resource Management to develop human capabilities for today's rail industry.

Right Track is live.
Right Track website home page
  1. 01

    Discovery

    NOW

    Desktop review, industry engagement and understanding current needs.

    Sep - Dec '26
  2. 02

    Design

    Co-design the framework, learning pathways and initial prototypes.

    Dec - Feb '27
  3. 03

    Development

    Build, test and refine practical learning resources.

    Feb - Apr '27
  4. 04

    Handover

    Finalise resources and support implementation and improvement.

    May '27
02 / What the desktop review found

Keep the foundations.
Update the focus.
Make it practical and accessible.

Three opportunities
01

Keep what works.

The nine core RRM themes remain a useful foundation. Many existing behaviours are still relevant; others need clearer definitions or practical guidance.

Existing strengthsUpdated definitionsCore principles
02

Reflect today's rail industry.

RRM needs to better reflect how work has changed: automation, digital tools, distributed teams, emerging risks and degraded operations.

AutomationConnected operationsChanging risks
03

Connect skills to systems.

Safe performance depends on people, teams and working conditions. The refresh can strengthen how skills are practised, supported and applied.

Work designTeam coordinationPractice and feedback
The question is not whether RRM still matters. It is where we focus the refresh.Over to you →
03 / Project timeline

Key project milestones.

Current phaseKey milestone in bold
01

Discovery

Now
Sep - Dec 2026
  • OctCommunications and launch
  • NovStakeholder mapping and co-design participant recruitment
  • Nov–DecDiscovery interviews and workshops
  • DecDiscovery Report
02

Design

Dec 2026 - Feb 2027
  • DecFunctional requirements identified for build, test, implementation
  • JanNew RRM framework built and initial prototypes developed
  • JanPlatform and module co-design
  • FebPlatform design finalised for framework, pathways, assessment
03

Development

Feb - Apr 2027
  • Mar–AprPlatform, admin, evaluation build complete
  • Mar–AprPilot and evaluate with end-users
  • AprCo-design testing and refinement
  • AprMaterials finalised
04

Handover

May 2027
  • MayEvaluation and refresher components
  • MayPerformance tracking component
  • MayHandover pack developed, handover graphic design
  • MayHandover sessions
05

Ongoing support

Jun 2027 - May 2028
  • Jun–NovFull ongoing support
  • JunSupport review with ONRSR
  • Dec–MayReduced ongoing support
GovernanceMonthly project performance review meetingsSep 2026 - Jun 2027

Source: RRM Toolkit project schedule. Payments and invoicing excluded.

04 / Where it started

RRM 2007

The original RRM Guideline (2007) gave Australian rail organisations practical, best-practice guidance on developing, implementing and integrating RRM training as an ongoing operating philosophy.

Intended benefits
01Reduce human error and prevent rail safety incidents
02Improve individual and team performance
03Strengthen safety culture
04Enhance the overall safety and efficiency of rail operations

Nine competency categories

WITH AN EXAMPLE 2007 BEHAVIOURAL MARKER
01
LeadershipDecisiveness: Decisive action is taken when informed of a situation affecting safety.
02
Task ManagementTime management: Time constraints are discussed with other team members when managing workload.
03
TeamworkUsing available resources: Advice is sought from other team members and sources.
04
CommunicationProviding clear information: Clear and unambiguous instructions, information and explanations are given.
05
Risk ManagementSafe operation: Operations are conducted within the rules, procedures and limits that apply to the task.
06
Situational AwarenessAnticipation: Problems are identified from available information, thinking at least one event ahead.Revised
07
Decision MakingConsult others: Opinions are sought, and consultation is mandatory for defined high-consequence decisions.Revised
08
Emergency ManagementSafety action: Action is taken to protect passengers and other workers from further danger.
09
Self ManagementSelf control: Emotions and behaviour are kept in check at work.
05 / Gap analysis method

Five tests, repeated for every module.

Using the 2007 Dédale Asia Pacific facilitator guide (plus Training Syllabus Annex B) as the baseline, each module was reviewed against what the evidence, the law and rail investigations say today. Every original element was then sorted into keep, change or add.

  1. 01

    Baseline the 2007 module

    List its behavioural markers (4 to 9 per module), underlying models (e.g. Blake & Mouton, SADIE, Endsley, the risk matrix), delivery format, case studies, assessment and follow-up.

  2. 02

    Test against current evidence

    Check each marker and core claim against post-2007 meta-analyses, systematic reviews and controlled trials. Claims not consistent with current references (e.g. “up to 90%”) were flagged for revision.

  3. 03

    Test against legal and regulatory duties

    Compare with WHS psychosocial hazard codes (2022–2025), the SFAIRP duty and ONRSR guidance. The 2007 modules often give the worker problems the law now assigns to the organisation.

  4. 04

    Test against recent rail investigations

    Use recent incidents (e.g. Cowan 2023, Picton 2022, Wallan, Carmont, TasRail 604) to ask whether the module would have equipped people for what went wrong. Pre-2006 case studies marked for replacement.

  5. 05

    Test delivery against training-transfer evidence

    Score the 2007 format against what predicts behaviour change on the job: needs analysis, practice, spacing, feedback and on-job reinforcement. Evidence strength reported for each review.

06 / Evidence base

Reviewed against contemporary evidence and good practice.

One review for each competency, drawing on sources mostly published 2013–2026.

229Sources in total
20–31Sources per module
Four types of source
  • 01Peer-reviewed research
  • 02Australian regulators Safe Work Australia, ONRSR
  • 03Rail investigators OTSI, ATSB, RAIB
  • 04Industry bodies RSSB, ARISO
RRM_Review_Gap_Analysis_Method.docxPages 2 - 7
References

All 229 sources cited across the nine review decks, listed by module and numbered as they appear in each review. Some sources are cited by more than one review.

01 Leadership (28 sources)
Leadership style and safety performance

1. Clarke, S. (2013). Safety leadership: a meta-analytic review. JOOP, 86(1).

2. Li, Z. et al. (2026). Impact of leadership styles on safety performance. Frontiers in Psychology.

3. Lacerenza, C.N. et al. (2017). Leadership training design, delivery and implementation. JAP, 102(12).

Voice, psychological safety and authority

4. CIPD (2024). Psychological safety: an evidence review.

5. Edmondson, A.C. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. ASQ, 44(2).

6. Cosby, K.S. & Croskerry, P. (2004). Authority gradients in medical error. Acad Emerg Med, 11(12).

7. Sekar, H. et al. (2022). Understanding authority gradient. The Obstetrician & Gynaecologist, 24(4).

8. Singer, S.J. & Tucker, A.L. (2014). The evolving literature on safety WalkRounds. BMJ Qual Saf, 23(10).

9. Graeff, C.L. (1997). Evolution of situational leadership theory. Leadership Quarterly, 8(2).

10. Thompson, G. & Vecchio, R.P. (2009). Situational leadership theory: a test of three versions. Leadership Quarterly, 20(5).

Just culture

11. Dekker, S. (2024). Restorative Just Culture, 4th ed. Routledge.

12. Dekker, S., Oates, A. & Rafferty, J. (2022). Restorative Just Culture in Practice. Routledge.

13. Dekker, S. (2016). Just culture: "evidence", power and algorithms.

14. Hollnagel, E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II. Ashgate.

Psychosocial regulation

15. Safe Work Australia (2022). Managing psychosocial hazards at work — model Code of Practice.

16. State and territory WHS psychosocial instruments, 2022–2025 (table, Recommendation 5).

Supervision and contractor management

17. ONRSR. Guideline — Safety Management System.

18. ONRSR. Contractor management, national priority pages and audits, 2020–2023.

19. ONRSR. Rail Safety Report 2024–25.

20. OTSI (NSW). Rail Worksite Protection, Report 2: Cowan, 11 January 2023.

21. OTSI (NSW). Rail Worksite Protection, Report 1: Picton, 16 August 2022.

22. RAIB (UK). Margam, 3 July 2019; ORR update, 7 February 2024.

23. RSSB (UK). Leading and lagging indicators, project T852, 2009–2011.

24. Kidda, S., Leone, J. & Lacey, S. (2025). Short Line Safety Institute systematic review. FRA.

25. ARISO (formerly RISSB). Contracting in the Rail Industry guideline.

26. "Tell them what they want to hear and get back to work" (2019). Transportation Research Part A.

Programme source material

27. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). Facilitator Guide, Module 01 — Leadership, 16 August 2007, and Training Syllabus Annex B.

28. Blake, R.R. & Mouton, J.S. (1964). HBR. Hersey, P. & Blanchard, K.H. (1999). Leadership and the One Minute Manager. Both cited as the 2007 package's source models.

02 Task Management (30 sources)
Cognitive science — attention, switching, interruption

1. Leroy, S. (2009). Why is it so hard to do my work? Attention residue when switching tasks. OBHDP, 109(2).

2. Watson, J.M. & Strayer, D.L. (2010). Supertaskers: profiles in extraordinary multitasking ability. Psychon Bull Rev, 17(4).

3. Altmann, E.M., Trafton, J.G. & Hambrick, D.Z. (2013). Momentary interruptions can derail the train of thought. JEP: General.

4. Dodhia, R.M. & Dismukes, R.K. (2009). Interruptions create prospective memory tasks. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(1).

5. Trafton, J.G. & Monk, C.A. (2007). Task interruptions. Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics, 3.

Automation

6. Parasuraman, R. & Manzey, D.H. (2010). Complacency and bias in human use of automation. Human Factors, 52(3).

7. Endsley, M.R. & Kiris, E.O. (1995). The out-of-the-loop performance problem. Human Factors, 37(2).

8. Billings, C.E. (1997). Aviation automation: the search for a human-centered approach. Erlbaum.

9. Kusumastuti, S.A. et al. (2025). Charting the landscape of rail human factors and automation. TRIP, 30.

10. Balfe, N., Sharples, S. & Wilson, J.R. (2015). Impact of automation in a complex control environment. Applied Ergonomics, 47.

11. Sharples, S., Millen, L., Golightly, D. & Balfe, N. (2011). The impact of automation in rail signalling operations. Proc IMechE Part F.

12. Verstappen, V., Pikaar, E. et al. (2022). Driver advisory systems, workload and attention allocation. Applied Ergonomics.

In-cab technology and signalling transition

13. Olsson, Rosberg, Kircher, Ahlström & Thorslund (2025). Visual behaviour of train drivers: ETCS vs lineside signalling. Cognition, Technology & Work.

14. Maynard, S., Filtness, A., Talbot, R. & Naweed, A. (2026). "It's like pinball": driver preferences and in-cab technology. Cognition, Technology & Work.

Rail workload, distraction and checking

15. Naweed, A. (2013). Psychological factors for driver distraction and inattention. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 60.

16. Pickup, L., Wilson, J.R., Norris, B.J., Mitchell, L. & Morrisroe, G. (2005). The Integrated Workload Scale. Applied Ergonomics.

17. Wilson, J.R., Pickup, L., Norris, B.J., Nichols, S. & Mitchell, L. (2005). Understanding mental workload in the railways. Ashgate.

18. (2025). Working memory capacity improves checking performance on a simulated rail control task. Applied Ergonomics.

19. Urbach, D.R. et al. (2014). Surgical safety checklists in Ontario. NEJM, 370.

20. EEMUA Publication 191. Alarm systems: design, management and procurement.

Australian and international regulatory and investigation material

21. ARISO. Guideline — the safe use of mobile electronic devices on the railway network. 2019, rev. 2024.

22. ONRSR. Rail Safety Report 2024–25.

23. ONRSR. Track Worker Safety — An Ongoing Focus.

24. Safe Work Australia (2022). Managing psychosocial hazards at work — model Code of Practice.

25. ATSB (2023). Derailment of passenger train ST23, Wallan, Victoria, 20 February 2020. RO-2020-002.

26. ATSB (2025). Briefing: communication issues prior to two near collisions, Brisbane suburban network.

27. RAIB (2023). Report 05/2023, track worker struck by train, Chalfont & Latimer, 15 April 2022.

28. RAIB (2026). Summary of Learning 11: Overspeeding.

29. Federal Railroad Administration. 49 CFR Part 220, Subpart C — Electronic Devices.

30. Hollnagel, E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II. Ashgate.

03 Teamwork (31 sources)
Team science and training evidence

1. McIntyre, R.M. & Salas, E. (1995). Measuring and managing for team performance. In Guzzo, Salas & Associates (Eds.), Team Effectiveness and Decision Making in Organizations. Jossey-Bass.

2. Salas, E. et al. (2008). Does team training improve team performance? A meta-analysis. Human Factors, 50(6).

3. Salas, E., Reyes, D.L. & McDaniel, S.H. (2018). The science of teamwork. American Psychologist, 73(4).

4. McEwan, D. et al. (2017). The effectiveness of teamwork training on teamwork behaviors and team performance. PLOS ONE, 12(1).

18. Salas, E. (Ed.). Crew Resource Management: Critical Essays; Salas, Burke, Bowers & Wilson. Team training in the skies: does CRM work? Human Factors.

19. Gjeraa, K. et al. and systematic reviews, incl. Advances in Simulation (2022). Simulation-based team training in healthcare.

30. Gregory Harland Ltd (2004). Teamworking in the Rail Industry: The Journey Guide. RSSB, London.

31. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project — Facilitator Guide, Module 03: Teamwork, and Training Syllabus, Annex B.

Psychological safety and speaking up

5. Frazier, M.L. et al. (2017). Psychological safety: a meta-analytic review and extension. Personnel Psychology, 70(1).

6. O'Donovan, R. & McAuliffe, E. (2020). Interventions to improve psychological safety, speaking up and voice behaviour. BMC Health Services Research, 20.

7. CIPD (2024). Psychological Safety: An Evidence Review — Scientific Summary.

Distributed teams, shared understanding and debriefing

8. Salmon, P.M., Stanton, N.A. & Jenkins, D.P. (2009). Distributed Situation Awareness. Ashgate/Routledge.

9. Stanton, N.A. et al. (2017). State-of-science: situation awareness in individuals, teams and systems. Ergonomics.

10. Barrett, A.K. et al. (2026). Swift trust in temporary systems. Small Group Research.

16. Tannenbaum, S.I. & Cerasoli, C.P. (2013). Do team and individual debriefs enhance performance? Human Factors, 55(1).

17. Health and Safety Executive (GB) / The Keil Centre. Safe communication at shift handover.

27. RSSB (Great Britain). Non-Technical Skills programme resources.

Psychosocial hazard and conduct regulation

11. Safe Work Australia (2022). Model Code of Practice: Managing Psychosocial Hazards at Work.

12. WorkSafe Victoria (2025). Occupational Health and Safety (Psychological Health) Regulations 2025.

13. Australian Human Rights Commission (2022). Fact Sheet: Respect@Work.

28. SafeWork NSW. Code of Practice: Managing Psychosocial Hazards at Work.

29. SafeWork SA (2026). Managing Psychosocial Hazards at Work Code of Practice.

Australian rail investigations and workforce data

14. Australasian Railway Association (2024). The Australian Rail Workforce: Gender Diversity Data Report 2024.

15. Australasian Railway Association. Australian rail workforce on the edge of a retirement cliff (media release).

20. ATSB (2023). Derailment of passenger train ST23, Wallan, Victoria, 20 February 2020. RO-2020-002.

21. ATSB (2021). Near hit with rail worker by passenger train 283D, Dora Creek, NSW, 9 May 2020. RO-2020-006.

22. ATSB. Collision between freight train Y375 and an excavator, near Fairfield Station, QLD, 15 July 2023. RO-2023-007.

23. ATSB (2025). Safeworking incident involving MTM trains 3148 and 7255, Ferntree Gully, Victoria, 25 February 2024. RO-2024-001.

24. ATSB (2014). Safe work on track across Australia: analysis of incident data, 2009–2014. RI-2014-011.

25. ONRSR. Track Worker Safety — An Ongoing Focus, and Rail Safety Report 2024–25.

26. Australian Rail Industry Standards Organisation (ARISO), formerly RISSB, renamed 27 November 2025.

04 Communication (26 sources)
Evidence base for safety-critical communication

1. Rail Safety and Standards Board. Safety Critical Communications: The Manual. RSSB research project T1078, November 2017.

2. RSSB. Developing a safety critical communications training programme (T1078), research catalogue entry, 2016–2017.

3. RSSB. RIS-8046-TOM Issue 2 — Spoken Safety Critical Communications, September 2019.

4. RSSB. Driver–signaller communication and train protection modelling, standards guidance page.

5. Modern Railways, "Culture still dogs Safety Critical Communications" — RSSB 2019 survey findings.

6. Young, M.S. & Steel, T. (RAIB). Non-technical skills in rail accidents: panacea or pariah? Rail Human Factors conference, 2017.

7. RAIB. Summary of learning — track worker safety.

Australian and international standards

8. RISSB (now ARISO). Safety Critical Communications Guideline, v1.0, 31 January 2018.

9. RISSB / ARISO. Code of Practice — Safety Critical Communications; AS 7660 Radio Communication in the Rail Corridor.

10. Rail Express, "RISSB announces name change as it embraces 'new era'" — RISSB became ARISO, 27 November 2025.

Read-back, hear-back and feedback science

11. NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, ASRS Directline — analysis of readback/hearback errors and expectancy.

12. Helmke, H., Ondřej, K., Shetty, S. et al. Readback error detection by automatic speech recognition and understanding. SESAR Innovation Days, 2022 (HAAWAII).

18. Kluger, A.N. & DeNisi, A. The effects of feedback interventions on performance. Psychological Bulletin, 1996; 119(2).

Speaking up and psychosocial duty

13. O'Donovan, R. & McAuliffe, E. A systematic review of interventions to improve psychological safety, speaking up and voice behaviour. BMC Health Services Research, 2020.

14. Omura, M., Maguire, J., Levett-Jones, T. et al. The effectiveness of assertiveness communication training programs. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 2017; 76.

15. Safe Work Australia. Managing psychosocial hazards at work — model Code of Practice, July 2022; and corresponding state codes.

Handover

16. Rasiya et al. Shift transition communication among nurses: a systematic review of ISBAR and SBAR-based structured handover tools. Nursing Open, 2026.

17. Health and Safety Executive (UK). Human factors topic guidance: Shift handover.

Workforce diversity, accessibility and channels

19. WorkSafe Victoria. Compliance code: communicating occupational health and safety across languages, 2022.

20. SafeWork NSW. CALD and migrant workers plan.

21. UIC / European Union Agency for Railways. Future Railway Mobile Communication System (FRMCS) programme materials; ERA ex-post analysis of GSM-R.

22. Transport for NSW. Digital Systems Program; ARTC Advanced Train Management System; Infrastructure Australia evaluation.

Australian rail investigations

23. ATSB. Rail occurrence investigation RO-2020-003 (Thorneside, Queensland, 7 March 2020); safety issue RO-2020-003-SI-01, closed 19 December 2023.

24. ATSB. Rail occurrence investigation RO-2023-007 — collision between freight train Y375 and an excavator, Fairfield Station, Queensland, 15 July 2023.

25. ONRSR. Safety Message: Management of Emergency Working / Unplanned Works, 1 March 2018.

26. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project — Facilitator Guide, Module 04: Communication, and Training Syllabus, Annex B.

05 Risk Management (20 sources)
Regulatory and standards

1. ONRSR. Safety Management System Guideline, v2.2, approved 2 March 2026.

2. ONRSR. Guideline — Meaning of duty to ensure safety so far as is reasonably practicable, May 2021.

3. ONRSR. Safety Message — Risk registers, 26 August 2025.

4. Rail Safety National Law (National Application) Act 2012, s46 — duty to ensure safety so far as is reasonably practicable.

5. ICMM. Health and Safety Critical Control Management: Good Practice Guide (2015) and Implementation Guide; CCM Good Practice Guide (2026).

6. AS ISO 31000:2018, Risk management — Guidelines.

7. AS/NZS 4360:1999, Risk management — withdrawn, superseded by AS ISO 31000.

8. Australian Rail Industry Standards Organisation (ARISO), formerly RISSB — name change effective 27 November 2025.

9. Work Health and Safety (Psychosocial Risks) Amendment Regulation 2022 (Qld); SafeWork NSW, Code of Practice: Managing psychosocial hazards at work.

Investigations

10. ATSB. RO-2020-002 — Derailment of passenger train ST23, Wallan, Victoria, 20 February 2020, final report 2023.

11. RAIB. Report 11/2020 — Track workers struck by a train at Margam, 3 July 2019.

12. RAIB. Report 10/2022 — Derailment at Carmont, Aberdeenshire, 12 August 2020.

Research and literature

13. Helmreich, R.L., Klinect, J.R. & Wilhelm, J.A. Threat and Error Management model and the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). University of Texas Human Factors Research Project.

14. Hollnagel, E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management.

15. Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D. & Leveson, N. (eds.) (2006). Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.

16. Dekker, S. (2011). Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex Systems.

17. Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA.

18. Cooper, M.D. (2020). A critical review of Safety-II and resilience-engineering claims. Safety Science, and related commentary.

19. Havinga, J., Shire, M.I. & Rae, A. (2022). "Should We Cut the Cards? Assessing the Influence of 'Take 5' Pre-Task Risk Assessments on Safety." Safety, 8(2), 27.

20. Rae, A. & Provan, D. (2018). "Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of 'safety' work that does not contribute to operational safety." Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, 16(2).

06 Situational Awareness (27 sources)
The construct and its measurement

1. Endsley, M.R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1).

2. Dekker, S. & Hollnagel, E. (2004). Human factors and folk models. Cognition, Technology & Work, 6(2).

3. Endsley, M.R. (2015). Situation awareness misconceptions and misunderstandings. JCEDM, 9(1).

4. Moens, L.L. et al. (2026). Measuring situation awareness: a meta-review across domains. Ergonomics.

Shared awareness and investigation practice

5. Salmon, P.M., Stanton, N.A. & Jenkins, D.P. (2009). Distributed situation awareness. Ashgate.

6. Salmon, P.M., Walker, G.H. & Stanton, N.A. (2015). Broken components versus broken systems. Cognition, Technology & Work, 17(2).

7. ATSB (2022). RO-2019-009: Signal DP29 passed at danger, Park Road Station, Queensland, 25 March 2019.

8. (2025). The good, the bad, and the lost: a meta-analysis of rail SPAD investigations using AcciMaps and systems thinking. Safety Science.

SPADs

9. ONRSR (2021). Safety message: A1 SPADs, limit of authority missed by train crew.

10. (2024). Railway signals passed at danger: a bibliometric analysis. Safety Science.

11. (2025). Enhancing railway operational safety: a quantitative risk assessment of signals passed at danger. Safety Science.

Vigilance and fatigue

12. Thomson, D.R., Besner, D. & Smilek, D. (2015). A resource-control account of sustained attention. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(1).

13. (2025). The vigilance decrement: its first 75 years. Frontiers in Cognition.

14. Sharpe (2025). The sustained attention paradox. Cognitive Science.

15. (2025). Beyond detection rate: understanding the vigilance decrement using signal detection theory.

16. (2025). Towards management of vigilance in railway operations through drivers state feedback loop. Cognition, Technology & Work.

17. (2024). High-speed train drivers' human error under fatigue and stress.

18. (2023). Research on multilevel situation awareness changes under the cumulative effect of mental fatigue. Cognition, Technology & Work.

19. Model WHS Regulation psychosocial hazard amendments, adopted across Australian jurisdictions 2022 to 2023.

Automation

20. (2025). Exploring train driving automation and signaling interaction.

21. (2025). Grades of operational and tactical automation in rail domain for an AI driving assistance system. Cognition, Technology & Work.

22. (2025). Beyond object identification: how train drivers evaluate the risk of collision. Cognition, Technology & Work.

Level crossing perception

23. Clark, H.E., Perrone, J.A. & Isler, R.B. (2013). An illusory size-speed bias and railway crossing collisions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 55.

24. Clark, H.E. et al. (2016). Fixating on the size-speed illusion of approaching railway trains. Accident Analysis & Prevention.

25. ONRSR (2025). 2024-25 Rail Safety Report, level crossings.

Programme source material

26. Dedale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project, facilitator guide, Module 06, Situational Awareness, amended 20 September 2007.

27. RRM programme curriculum notes, Curriculum and Contemporary Practice (Situational Awareness), v0.1, September 2026. Consulted as a cross-check only.

07 Decision Making (21 sources)
Foundational decision research

1. Kahneman, D. & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64(6), 515–526.

2. Klein, G.A., Calderwood, R. & Clinton-Cirocco, A. (1986). Rapid decision making on the fireground. Human Factors Society Conference, 1.

3. Orasanu, J. & Connolly, T. (1993). The reinvention of decision making. In Decision Making in Action.

4. Klein, G.A. (2003). Decision skills training for the aviation community. In Innovation and Consolidation in Aviation.

5. Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M. & Martin, L. (eds.) (1997). Decision Making Under Stress.

Bias and debiasing evidence

6. Korteling, J.E., Gerritsma, J.Y.J. & Toet, A. (2021). Retention and transfer of cognitive bias mitigation interventions. Frontiers in Psychology, 12:629354.

7. Fasolo, B., Heard, C. & Scopelliti, I. (2025). Mitigating cognitive bias to improve organizational decisions. Journal of Management, 51(6).

8. SKYbrary / Flight Safety Foundation. OGHFA Briefing Note, Press-on-itis.

Decision tools and rail non-technical skills

9. Soll, H., Proske, S., Hofinger, G. & Steinhardt, G. (2016). Decision-making tools for aeronautical teams: FOR-DEC and beyond. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 6(2).

10. RSSB. Non-technical skills resources, including the FORCE decision-making frame.

11. Madigan, R., Golightly, D. & Madders, R. (2015). Rail industry requirements around non-technical skills. Contemporary Ergonomics and Human Factors 2015.

Investigations

12. ATSB (2023). RO-2020-002 — Derailment of passenger train ST23, Wallan, Victoria, 20 February 2020.

13. ATSB (2022). RO-2018-014 — Runaway and derailment of TasRail freight train 604, Railton to Devonport, 21 September 2018.

14. ATSB (2023). REPCON RR2023-00035 — discrepancies in the Rail Traffic Overview Application display.

15. RAIB (2022). Report 02/2022 — Derailment of a passenger train at Carmont, Aberdeenshire, 12 August 2020.

Regulation

16. ONRSR. Meaning of Duty to Ensure Safety SFAIRP Guideline, 25 May 2021.

17. ONRSR. Safety Management System Guideline, 1 July 2022.

18. ONRSR. Fatigue Risk Management Guideline, 1 July 2022.

19. Rail Safety National Law.

Technology and decision support

20. Leyli-abadi, M. et al. (2025). A conceptual framework for AI-based decision systems in critical infrastructures. AI4REALNET. arXiv:2504.16133.

Source material

21. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project, Facilitator Guide, Module 07: Decision Making, and Training Syllabus, Annex B.

08 Emergency Management (21 sources)
Skill retention and decay

1. Procedural Skills Decay in Emergency Medicine: A Scoping Review. PMC13051320.

2. Procedural skill retention and decay: A meta-analytic review (2025). PMID 40455501.

3. Competence retention in safety-critical professions: A systematic literature review. Educational Research Review.

Startle, surprise and stress

4. Field, Boland, van Rooij, Mohrmann & Smeltink (2018). Startle Effect Management. EASA / NLR-CR-2018-242.

5. Saunders, Driskell, Johnston & Salas (1996). The effect of stress inoculation training on anxiety and performance. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology.

6. Burian, Barshi & Dismukes (2005). Center, we have a problem: emergency and abnormal situations in aviation. 13th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.

Evacuation behaviour

7. RAIB (2024). Report 03/2024 — Uncontrolled evacuation at Clapham Common London Underground station, 5 May 2023.

8. RSSB (2019). Research project S341, Understanding and Preventing Passenger Self-Evacuation from Trains.

9. Boer (2005). Getting passengers out — evacuation behaviours. In Rail Human Factors. Ashgate.

10. RAIB. Investigation into trains stranded near Lewisham, 2 March 2018 (report 2019).

19. Muir (2004). Human behaviour in emergency situations. Railtrack conference proceedings.

Regulation and planning

11. ONRSR (2024). Safety Message: Emergency Management Plans, 24 June 2024.

12. ARISO (formerly RISSB) (2018). Guideline: Rail Emergency Management Planning, v2.0.

13. Rail Safety National Law, ss 102 and 113, and National Regulations regs 19 and 20.

18. RSSB. GERT8000-M1, Dealing with a train accident or train evacuation.

20. AFAC. Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (AIIMS) doctrine.

Post-incident psychological response

14. WHO (2012). Psychological debriefing in people exposed to a recent traumatic event. mhGAP evidence profile.

15. TrackSAFE Foundation (2023). Trauma Management Framework.

16. Safe Work Australia (2022). Model Code of Practice: Managing psychosocial hazards at work.

Simulation and exercises

17. Investigating passengers' evacuation behavior in a burning metro train carriage: an immersive virtual reality experiment (2025). Journal of Transportation Safety & Security.

Source material

21. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project, Facilitator Guide, Module 08: Emergency Management.

09 Self Management (25 sources)
Law and regulator

1. Rail Safety National Law, ss 52, 56, 99 and 116; National Regulations, reg 29 and Schedule 2.

2. ONRSR (2022). Guideline: Fatigue Risk Management, 1 July 2022.

3. ONRSR. Managing fatigue, Safety Essentials.

4. ONRSR (2022). Drug and Alcohol Post Incident Testing, 16 May 2022.

21. ONRSR (2018). Guideline: Rail Resource Management, 8 August 2018.

22. ONRSR (2022). Guideline: Safety Management System, 1 July 2022.

Codes and standards

5. Safe Work Australia (2022). Model Code of Practice: Managing psychosocial hazards at work.

6. Safe Work Australia. Model Code of Practice: Managing the risk of fatigue at work.

7. Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Psychological Health) Regulations (Victoria).

8. National Transport Commission (2024). National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers, effective 11 November 2024.

25. Safe Work Australia. Guidance on working in heat.

Investigation

9. ATSB. Safety issue RO-2018-018-SI-05, Fatigue management of train drivers, arising from the Port Hedland ore train M02712, 5 November 2018.

Fatigue and sleep

10. Dawson & Reid (1997). Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment. Nature, 388, 235.

11. Fan & Smith (2018). A preliminary review of fatigue among rail staff. Frontiers in Psychology, 9:634.

12. RSSB. Using biomathematical models to assess rosters for fatigue.

13. IATA Human Factors Task Force (2025). Uses and Limitations of Biomathematical Fatigue Models.

24. IARC. Night shift work, classified as probably carcinogenic to humans.

Health and sleep disorders

14. Abeyaratne, Casolin & Luscombe (2023). Safety incidents and obstructive sleep apnoea in railway workers. Occupational Medicine, 73(2), 97–103.

15. Impact of rail medical standard on obstructive sleep apnoea prevalence. Occupational Medicine, 66(1), 2016.

Psychological health and culture

16. Vainre et al. (2025). Mindfulness-based programmes for work performance. Stress and Health.

17. Bartlett et al. (2019). Workplace mindfulness training RCTs: a meta-analysis. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 24(1).

18. Joyce et al. (2019). Resilience@Work Mindfulness Program with first responders. JMIR.

19. Edmondson (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2).

23. Dekker. Restorative just culture.

Source material

20. Dédale Asia Pacific (2007). National Rail Resource Management Project, Facilitator Guide, Module 09: Self Management.

07 / How gaps were recorded

Gap analysis findings.

Each original 2007 element was marked Retained, Revised or New (a present gap). Across the nine modules, 58 elements became 100.

20Retained
37Revised
43New
Module 2007 Retained Revised New Proposed Sources
01 Leadership 7 4 3 4 11 28
02 Task Management 7 1 6 5 12 30
03 Teamwork 7 2 4 5 11 31
04 Communication 9 1 8 4 13 26
05 Risk Management 8 4 4 4 12 20
06 Situational Awareness 6 4 2 3 9 27
07 Decision Making 5 0 5 8 13 21
08 Emergency Management 4 2 2 4 8 21
09 Self Management 5 2 3 6 11 25
Total 58 20 37 43 100 229

For each competency, the review provided:

  • Recommendations
  • A proposed marker set with observable learning objectives
  • A delivery design
  • A list of supporting materials
  • Questions to clarify with stakeholder groups

Key improvement opportunities

  • From style to behaviour. Teach observable, trainable behaviours rather than personal styles or traits.
  • Organisation as well as individual. Workload, fatigue, psychosocial hazards and SFAIRP duties sit with the organisation, not the worker alone.
  • Reflect how rail works today. Interruptions, automation, distributed teams and degraded working.
  • Retire or reframe. What is less relevant today or reframe to a modern context.
  • Design for effective transfer of learning. From one-off training and discussions to practice, refreshers, feedback and on-job reinforcement.
08 / Your turn

Help shape the future of RRM.

We have brought the desktop review findings together. Now we want your judgement on what matters most.

01Tell us your role and business function.
02Choose three priority improvements.
03Choose three priority capabilities.

Join on your device

WORKSHOP ACTIVITY
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10-minute presentation10-minute group activityLive discussion
09 / Question 1 · Tell us about yourself

Who's in the room?

A quick introduction before we prioritise. Tell us your role and the part of the rail industry you work in.

Your role Free text · e.g. Human Factors Advisor
Business function Operations · Safety/WHS · Training · Projects · Other
Future co-design Optional interest and email, kept private

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Business functions represented

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10 / Question 2 · Improvement priorities

Where should RRM improve?

We have grouped 77 recommendations into 18 opportunities across the nine RRM themes. Choose up to three improvements from the full set.

11 / Question 3 · Capability priorities

What should people be better able to do?

We have grouped 100 behavioural markers into 27 capabilities across the nine themes. Choose up to three capabilities from the full set. ↻ Click a card to reveal its description.

12 / Where to from here

Next stop:co-design.

Today's discussion is one part of a wider engagement process. Your priorities will help shape the next steps.

01 / TODAY

Identify priorities.

Capture expert perspectives on the most important RRM improvement opportunities and capabilities.

Human factors workshop
02 / NEXT

Co-design and refine.

Explore and validate priorities with the RRM reference group and people across the rail industry.

Consultation and prototypes
03 / THEN

Develop and test.

Translate priorities into practical learning resources, then test and refine them with industry.

Development, testing and handover
Developed with industry, for industry

What should the future of RRM look like?

Thank you for helping us get Right Track on track.

Click here to explore Right Track and get involved